SiC: An Agent Based Architecture for Preventing and Detecting Attacks to Ubiquitous Databases by Pinzón, Cristian et al.
SiC: An agent based architecture for preventing
and detecting attacks to ubiquitous databases
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Abstract One of the main attacks to ubiquitous databases is the SQL inject on
attack which causes severe damage both in the commercial aspect, as in the confi-
dence of users. This paper proposes the SiC architecture as asolution to the SQL
injection attack problem. This is a hierarchical distributed multiagent architecture
which incorporates an entirely new approach with respect toexisting architectures
for the prevention and detection of SQL injections. SiC incorporates a kind of in-
telligent agent which integrates a case-based reasoning system. This agent, which is
the core of the architecture, allows the application of detection techniques based on
anomalies as well as detection techniques based on patterns, which provide a great
degree of autonomy, flexibility, robustness and dynamic scalability. The character-
istics of the multiagent system allow the architecture to detect attacks from different
types of devices, regardless of the physical location. The architecture has been tested
on a medical database guaranteeing safe access from variousdevices such as PDAs
and computers notebook. This paper describes the main features of the architecture
SiC (An agent based architecture for preventing and detecting attacks to ubiquitous
databases) and shows the results obtained in the case of study.
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1 Introduction
New technologies have provided ubiquitous working environme ts without time and
location constraint. Nowadays, users handle several mobile devices such as a note-
book computers, PDAs or intelligent phones. These devices manage information
in immediate way, independently of the physic location and time instant. This new
computing environments are supported by the growth of the network computing,
especially wireless networks [26]. Furthermore, it is necessary taking into account
a distributed database in a strategic mode. Databases provide information to user
applications on the different devices.
Information systems are based on a back-end database system. Th database is
a critical piece both in daily operations and on decision making [10]. Information
systems have great impact on every one aspect of the daily life (e.g. bank account
register, medical register, retirement, payroll, phone regist r, tax register, vehicle
register, supermarket purchase, school register). Anythig meaning data of the daily
life is stored on a database system [32]. Because of to this situation the databases
are target of a great number of attacks. The current solutions have been unable to
provide enough confidentiality and integrity of the stored data. Firewalls, Intrusion
Detection System (IDS), antivirus software and other security measures are limited
and cannot protect of new coming threats.
The effort carried out in order to detect and stop the attackstargeted to the in-
formation systems, seems to be not very sound. However, the cyber attack problem
acquires more importance if it is taken into account recent tchnologies. Nowadays
the users use mobile devices with access via wireless. Thesedevices have a great ca-
pability to access data in ubiquitous way. As a consequence of th se new computing
environments, the information should be distributed to fulfil the requests of different
users independently of the location, platform or physical device. The distribution of
information supports ubiquitous databases, where the dataare partitioned according
to the autonomy degree and efficiency that it requires to reach. The distribution of
information and new technologies make it possible an increase of complexes attacks
directed to the databases. One of the weak points on new working environments is
caused by the data transference through insecure communicatio hannels, such as
the local networks and Internet. This weakness is exploitedby a malicious user who
scans the traffic for eavesdropping and can steal, change or delete sensitive informa-
tion.
The SQL injection represents a potential attack for the database systems. The
SQL injection attack is at the top of the list of latest threats in recent years. The
damages by a SQL injection attack involve financial losses, hit the reliance of the
consumers, providers and trading partners, in addition to disrupt the development of
outside and inside activities into the organization [13]. The architecture presented at
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this paper, named SiC (Agent based architecture for preventing and detecting attacks
to ubiquitous database), is targeted for solving the problem of the SQL injection at-
tacks on databases. This proposal is oriented for ubiquitous environments but it is
not only limited for this scenario. SiC proposes a novel strategy to block SQL injec-
tion attack through a distributed approach based on the capacities of the agents and
multiagent systems [49]. The philosophy of multiagent systems allows dealing with
the SQL injection attacks from a perspective of the elementsof communication,
ubiquity and autonomous computation and from a standpoint of a global coordi-
nated system. Every component in SiC interacts and coordinates to achieve a global
common goal of them all. SiC presents a hierarchical organization structured by lev-
els or layers of agents. The agents of each level have assigned specific tasks which
can be executed of independent way to their physic location.The complexity of the
agents increments with the advance by the hierarchies pyramid. This hierarchical
structure allows a distribution of roles and tasks for the detection and prevention of
SQL injection attacks. Additionally it has a great capacityfor errors recovery.
The use of agents with advanced capabilities to reason and predict situations is
the main feature of the architecture. SiC makes use of CBR-BDI agents [15], which
are characterized by the integration of a CBR mechanism (Case-B ed Reasoning)
[1]. This mechanism provides the agents a greater level of adapt tion and learning
capacity. CBR systems make use of past experiences to solve new problems [22].
Thus, it is possible to generate new solutions from the results obtained in problems
with similar characteristics occurred in the past. CBR systems are characterized by
executing a reasoning cycle to solve each new problem. This reasoning cycle is able
to make a feedback from each new experience and modifying thecas memory and
the reasoning capacity according to new changes. This latter is v ry suitable to block
SQL injection attacks by anomaly detection [35], [29]. A CBRsystem learns and
predicts behaviours or events that disclose a particular signature of a SQL injection
attack. CBR-BDI agents have a predictive capacity by means of a mixture of neural
network within the adaptation stage of the CBR cycle.
Agents can be characterized through their capacities in areas such as autonomy,
reasoning, reactivity, social abilities, proactivity, and mobility, among other. These
capacities provide great advantage for offering solutionsat highly dynamic and dis-
tributed environment. Many activities in areas as networkssecurity, e-commerce,
telecommunications, among other are carried out by multiagent systems imple-
mented successfully [19], [7], [2]. The capacity of the agents to be executed by
mobile devices such as PDAs, mobile phones and notebook computers makes them
particularly suitable at the strategy to detect SQL injection attacks on ubiquitous
databases. The agents integrated in SiC are based on the BDI deliberative model
(Believe, Desire, Intention) [48], [21]. The internal struct re of these agents and the
capacities are based on mental aptitude using beliefs, desires and intentions [12].
In summary, a distributed hierarchical multiagent architecture is presented as a
solution to SQL injection attacks. The main feature of SiC isthe use of CBR-BDI
agents with detection and predictions capabilities to classify and block this type of
threat. CBR systems are especially suitable to solve classification problems, similar
to the SQL injection attacks. CBR-BDI agents incorporate a mixture of neural net-
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works in the adaptation phase of the CBR cycle to predict new attacks. Finally, the
architecture handles misuse detection, which allows accomplish all the strategy of
detection and prevention proposed.
The preliminary results obtained after the implementationof the initial prototype
show the effectiveness of the strategy to minimize attacks;the highest performance
through the distribution of the workload among the available nodes into the archi-
tecture; the scalability, offering an easy way to incorporate new nodes in monitored
environments; a great learning and adaptation capacity, provided by the CBR mech-
anism and the mixture of neural networks; and the flexibilityto be adapted to many
susceptible scenario to SQL injection attacks. The ultimate goal of this work is the
presentation of a novel solution, effective and designed for working in new environ-
ments, mainly in those where the mobility of the informations essential.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents the prob-
lem that has prompted most of this research work; section 3 describes the SiC ar-
chitecture, different agents incorporated to the architectur and the communication
among them; section 4 explains in detail the most important agent of SiC architec-
ture, the CBR-BDI classifier agent. Finally section 5 describes a study case using a
medical database and presents the results and conclusion.
2 Database Threat and Security Revision
Data are stored in a ubiquitous database in order to the applic tions have access to
them from any location and any time. A ubiquitous system is necessarily distributed
[52], claiming that data have to be present everywhere for the authorized user. This
feature is achieved when the databases are partitioned, so that data are distributed in
several local databases strategically located on different g ographic nodes.
A ubiquitous database allows any user to access its data throug custom applica-
tions. The source of these data do not need to be known by the user. The develop-
ment of a ubiquitous model has two determining factors; the rising tide of Internet
and the World Wide Web. These factors had been made into in a means for the
global spreading and the data interchange. In this sense, databases have played a
crucial role for the storage of a huge volume of data. On the otr hand, the access
via wireless has enabled a great interconnection among devices and unrestricted
data accesses.
As a result of the decentralization of the information, new issues about the pri-
vacy and the information security have been addressed. In recent years, large com-
panies have opted by transferring the management control throug service outsourc-
ing of a specialized supplier for specific tasks. One of the most n table outsourcing
services is database outsourcing where organizations outsource the data storage and
management to third-party service supplier [51]. This management model has gener-
ated discussions about the issue of sharing sensitive data that might endanger private
information of clients and the organization itself. In the same vein, the knowledge
extracting through rules of data mining have caused hard criticism. The tools used
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to discover unknown patterns can extract unauthorized information that place in risk
the privacy of individuals and the confidentiality of their data [45]. Regarding the on-
going threats targeted against the information system and dtabases are the viruses
and worms. The worms are considered a particularly dangerous threat because of
its evolution towards complex techniques to avoid the security mechanisms. They
can carry an explosive charge to be executed according to fixed conditions by the
hacker. New sophisticated variants of worms are expected tobec me more preva-
lent in short term such as SQL injecting attacks through the application layer [6].
Because of the increase of incidents, the information security is considered a critical
issue within the strategic policies of organizations. In the commercial sector and the
research centers, increasingly are destined resources andhuman capital to research
new security solutions that can face new attacks and to protect corporate databases.
Security measures to protect information systems and databases of outsider
attacks include firewalls, filters, authentication, communication transport encryp-
tion, intrusion detection, auditing, monitoring, honeypots, security tokens, biomet-
ric devices, sniffers, active blocking, file level securityanalysis or Demilitarized
Zone [36]. In the particular case of the database security, it is necessary a closer
look from a outlook of mechanisms such as access control policies, authentication
and identification mechanisms. In a multilevel secure database management sys-
tem (MLS/DBMS), authorized users at different security levels access and share a
database at different security levels without violating security. The security policy
of MSL/DBMS includes a policy for mandatory access control (MAC) and dis-
cretionary access control (DAC). Mandatory security contrls estrict access to data
depending on the sensitivity levels of the data and the authorization level of the user.
Discretionary Security measures are usually in the form of rules, which specify the
type of access that users or groups of users may have to different kinds of data [10].
Additionally to these mechanisms, other approaches have aris n such as the Hippo-
cratic Databases inspired in the Hippocratic Oath [3] and the use of cryptography
techniques to protect the confidentiality of data [33].
The current databases security measures seem insufficient and less if it is exam-
ined from the perspective of the threats targeted to the new working environments.
Nowadays the attacks are addressed to the application layerand the database sys-
tems causing that the protection mechanisms cannot detect them. A decade or more
ago, databases were usually kept physically secure in a central data center and ac-
cessed mostly by applications into the corporate borders. However, now applications
and databases may be distributed in business units to meet local needs. Even more
critical is the fact that these applications and databases are increasingly available
to suppliers, customers and business partners in order to carry out business over
the Web [5]. Organizations are hit hard when a malicious userbypass or violates
protective measures to steal, modify or destroy sensitive information.
SQL injection attacks are a potential threat at the application layer. The Structure
Query Language (SQL) forms the backbone of many Database Management Sys-
tems, especially relational databases. It allows carry outinformation handling and
databases management, but it also facilitates building a type of attack which results
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extremely lethal. The SQL injection is not a new attack, but it has not been removed
of the threat list for databases.
A SQL injection attack brings harm to the organizations suchas financial losses;
break up to the reliance coming from the customers, suppliers and business part-
ners and disrupts the outside and inside activities into of the organization. A SQL
injection attack takes place when a hacker changes the semantic or syntactic logic
of a SQL text string by inserting SQL keywords or special symbols within the orig-
inal SQL command that will be executed at the database layer of an application
[4], [31], [24]. The response capacity after carried out a SQL injection attack de-
pends on the type of technique used and the caused damage grade. This response
can take hours, days and even weeks. Web applications are themain target of this
type of attack. In the case of these applications, the staticchain is concatenated with
user inputs. If the user inputs are tainted, an injection attack is carried out when
the query is executed on database. However, even though the most common attack
method being through request via HTTP (HyperText TransportPro ocol) protocol,
other methods are vulnerable to a SQL injection attack. Applications on wireless
mobile devices execute SQL queries on the database. These quri s are transmitted
through insecure transmission channel allowing that it canbe monitored, captured
and changed by a hacker. Finally, a recent vulnerability hasarisen in the pervasive
computing applications by the use devices or sensors vulnerable [42], [40], [41].
This new technology has presented security hole and therefor it can be exploited
by a SQL injection attack causing great damage.
The cause of the SQL injection attacks is relatively simple.This attack is caused
by inadequate input validation on user interface. As a result of this attack a hacker
can carry out an unauthorized data handling, retrieval of confidential information,
and in the worst possible case, to take over control of the application server. The
main features to give a detailed description of a SQL injection attack are the attack
mechanism used and the attack intention [25].
The most commons Database Management Systems such as Microsoft SQL
Server, Oracle, MySQL, Informix, Sybase have been target ofSQL injection attacks
at recent year [32]. The problem of the SQL injection attack increases with the use
of technologies designed to offer new working environments, especially in sectors
such as e-commerce, healthcare system, industry, e-government, among other. The
benefits offered by the new devices such as the full interconnection and corporate
database access from any location, can give space to SQL injectio attacks. The new
working environments require information at any location and time for all the autho-
rized users. This fact forces to a decentralization of data and a strategic location of
databases into the working environments. In the case of the SQL injection attacks,
this setting is special to exploit new vulnerabilities.
SQL injection attacks have led up to a significant number of researches, both in
the sector commercial as at academic research centers. Unfortunately the advances
in the detection and prevention measures have not achieved the required level for
overcome this type of attack. The current security productsfound at the market are
vitals at the defence of the information security; nevertheless the results against
the SQL injection attacks are poor enough. The low efficacy isdue to that security
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measures are not intended for a specific type of attack, but onthe contrary, they
are diversified to many threats. These security products arenot intended for SQL
injection attacks exclusively.
Regarding the proposed academic approaches as solution to the SQL injection
attacks, a wide revision is carried out. Some Artificial intellig nce techniques have
been proposed as solution to the SQL injection attack. Between the approaches re-
vised is WAVES (Web Application Vulnerability and Error Scaner) [27]. This so-
lution is based on a black-box technique. WAVES is a web crawler that identifies
vulnerable points, and then builds attacks that target those points based on a list
of patterns and attack techniques. WAVES monitors the response from the appli-
cation and uses a machine learning technique to improve the at ack methodology.
WAVES can not check all the vulnerable points like the traditional penetration test-
ing. The strategy used by the intrusion detection systems have been implemented
in the SQL injection attacks. Valeur [46] presents an IDS approach which uses a
machine learning technique based on a dataset of legal transactions. These are used
during the training phase prior to monitoring and classifying malicious accesses.
Generally, IDS systems depends on the quality of the training set; a poor training
set would result in a large number of false positives and negatives. Rietta [43], pro-
posed a IDS system at the application layer using an anomaly detection model which
assumes certain behaviour of the traffic generated by the SQLqueries; that is, ele-
ments within the query (sub-queries, literals, keyword SQL). It also applies general
statistics and proposes grouping the queries according to SQL commands and then
comparing them against a previously built model. The SQL query that deviates from
the normal profile is rejected. The proposals based on intruson detection depend on
database, which requires a continue updating in order to detect new attacks. Finally,
Skaruz [44] proposes the use of a recurrent neural network (RNN). The detection
problem becomes a time serial prediction problem. This approaches present as main
problem a large number of false positive and false negative.
Other strategy based on techniques of string analysis and the generations of dy-
namic models has been proposed as solution to the SQL injection attacks. The Java
String Analysis (JSA) library [16] provides a mechanism forgenerating models of
Java strings. JSA performs a conservative string analysis of an application and cre-
ates automata that express all the possible values a specificstring can have at a
point in the application. This technique is not targeted to SQL injection attacks, but
it is important because other approach use the library to generate middle forms of
models. JDBC Checker [23] is a technique for statically checking the type correct-
ness on SQL queries dynamically generated. This technique was not intended to
detect and prevent general SQL injection attacks, but can beused to prevent attacks
that take advantage of type mismatches in a dynamically generated query string.
Wassermann and Su [47] proposed an approach that uses a static analysis combined
with automated reasoning. The technique verifies that the SQL queries generated
in the application usually do not contain a tautology. The technique detects only
SQL injections that insert a tautology in the SQL queries, but can not detect other
types of SQL injections attacks. Halfond and Orso [24] propose AMNESIA (Anal-
ysis and Monitoring for Neutralizing SQL Injection Attacks). This approach uses a
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static analysis to build the models of the SQL queries that anapplication generates
at each point of access to the database. In the dynamic phase,AMNESIA captures
all the SQL queries before they are sent to the database and checks each query
against the statically built models. Queries that violate th model are classified as
SQL injection attacks. AMNESIA depends on accuracy static analysis. With only
slight variations of accuracy, it generates a large number of false positive and neg-
atives. SQLGuard [14] is an approach that checks queries at runtime to analyze if
these queries conform to a model of expected queries. In thisapproaches, the model
is expressed as a grammar that only accepts legal queries. Thmodel is deduced
at runtime by examining the structure of the query before andfter the addition
of user input. The approach uses a secret key to delimit user input during parsing
by the runtime checker. The security of this approach depends o an attacker not
being able to find the key. Additionally, it requires that theprogrammer rewrites
the code to use a special middle library. Kosuga et al proposes SANIA (Syntactic
and Semantic Analysis for Automated Testing against SQL Injection) [28] SANIA
captures queries between Web application and database. It autom tically generates
crafted attacks according the syntax and semantic of vulnerabl points. SANIA uses
a syntactic analysis tree of the query to evaluate the security of the points. SANIA
presents a drawback; it has a significant rate of false positive.
Other main query development paradigms proposed as solution to SQL injection
attacks are mentioned. SQLrand [11] provides a framework that allows developers
to create SQL queries using randomized keywords instead of the normal SQL key-
words. A proxy between the web application and the database serv r captures SQL
queries and de-randomizes the keywords. The SQL keywords injected by an attacker
would not have been constructed by the randomized key-words, so the tainted SQL
strings would have syntax error. SQLrand depend on secret key to modify keywords,
its security relies on hackers not being able to discover this key. Additionally it re-
quires the application developer to rewrite code. SQL DOM [34] and Safe Query
Objects [17] use encapsulation of database queries to avoidSQL injection attacks.
These techniques changing the process to build SQL string toone systematically
way that uses a type-checked API. Within the API is able to systematically ap-
ply coding best practices such as input filtering and close-fitting type checking of
user input. Although effective, these techniques have the drawback that both require
developers to learn and use a new programming paradigm or query development
process.
A great interest has existed to overcome to the SQL injectionattacks through
new solutions. However, the approach addressed for this type of attack has been
limited to centralized models with little flexibility, scalability and a low efficacy. If
it is considered the use of new technologies such as mobile technology, many of
these solutions are not easy to implement or they require changes to adapt to this
environments. In this sense a solution has been proposed to work at scenarios where
the protecting of the database and the information is carried out into a ubiquitous
environment. The proposal is based on a distributed hierarchical multiagent archi-
tecture, using autonomous agents organized by levels. It isan innovative solution to
stop the SQL injection attacks. The special design allows incorporating two main
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techniques used in the IDS Systems, such as anomaly detection and misuse detec-
tion. Both techniques are integrated inside of SiC architectur .
With a well structured architecture, each component knows its roles and has the
necessary resource to do its job. SiC as solution to SQL inject on attack is effective,
presents a great performance and provides flexibility, adapt bility and scalability
for new computation environments. In the next section is presented in detail the
architecture SiC, describing each one of its levels, type ofagents, interaction, com-
munication and tasks.
3 An Architecture based on Multiagent System
The agents handle capacities such as autonomy, social abilities, reasoning, learn-
ing, mobility, among other [49]. One of the main features of agents is their ability
to carry out cooperative and collaborative work, when they are grouped into mul-
tiagent systems to solve problems in form distributed [18].These features make
to the agents suitable to deal with the SQL injection attacks. A distributed hierar-
chical multiagent architecture presents a great capacity for the distribution of task
and responsibilities, failure recovering, adaptation to new changes and high level
of learning. These factors are keys to achieve a robust and efficient solution. One
of the main novelties of the architecture is the use of CBR-BDI agent [30], which
presents a great capacity of learning and adaptation. The agents BDI have a delib-
erative structure based on the BDI model [49]. Moreover, a BDI agent integrates a
case-based reasoning mechanism [1] that allow solving problems through the use de
past experiences. As the core of the strategy for the classification of SQL queries is
founded in detection by anomaly, it seems appropriate to usea CBR mechanism [1]
that leverages past experience to detect anomaly. This CBR mechanism additionally
incorporates a mixture of neural networks [38] in its reuse phase. This mixture of
neural networks provides a capacity for the prediction of SQL injection attack.
The SiC presents as additional advantage, the use of wireless mobiles device,
which can execute mobile agents. These devices have experimented a great growth
in recent year, and it is common to find SQL queries that can be originated from dif-
ferent mobile devices including personal assistants (PDA), mobile phones, computer
notebooks and workstations. The agents based on misuse detection and anomaly de-
tection can be organized in a distributed way to leverage of available resources and
improve the performance of the classification process, regardless of the nature of the
physic device. The approach is based on an organizational design that is obtained
through a multi-hierarchical architecture. The agents aredistributed so that at the
time of initiating a classification task, each type of agent knows its responsibilities;
the data it needs to do its job and where to send the results. The interaction and
communication between the agents is crucial to achieve the goal of classification
and detection of SQL injection attacks.
Next, it is described each type of agent with their tasks within of the architecture
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• Sensor agents: They are incorporated at each device with access to the database.
Their functions consist on capturing datagrams, ordering of TCP fragments for
extracting the SQL query string, and syntactic analysis. The tasks of the Sensor
agents end when the results (the SQL string transformed by the analysis, the
result of the analysis of the SQL string and the user data) aresent to the next
agent at the hierarchy of the classification process.
• FingerPrint agents: The numbers of FingerPrint agents depend on the workload
at a given time. An FingerPrint agent receives the information of a Sensor agent
and executes a searching process and matching with well known pattern stored
at a previously built database. The FingerPrint agents works in coordination with
the Pattern agents to search and save SQL string patterns in the da abase. The
FingerPrint agent finishes its task when it sends its resultstogether with the re-
sults of the Sensor agent to the Anomaly agent. The results ofthe FingerPrint
agent consist of the SQL string transformed by the analysis,the result of the
analysis of the SQL string, the user data and the search results.
• Pattern Agent: It is the responsible to save the new SQL string patterns in the
database and search for patterns when the FingerPrint agentrequests it.
• Anomaly agents: They are the core of the classification process. Their strat-egy
is founded in a case-based reasoning mechanism that incorporates a mixture of
neural networks. These agents retrieval those similar pastcases to the new case
of classification, training the neural networks with the recovered cases and gen-
erating the final classification. The numbers of Anomaly agents depend on the
workload at a given time. The result of the classification is sent to the Manager
agent for the evaluation. This agent work in coordination with the LogUser agent.
• LogUser agent: This agent records the actions of the user andit searches for the
user profile (the historical profile and the user statistics)when it is requested by
the Classifier agent.
• Manager agent: This agent allows to an expert to evaluate theclassification pro-
cess and situations that not have been solved in the classifiction process such
as a suspicious classification. Moreover, it allows adjustment at the configura-
tion of the architecture, carries a record and control of theactive agents in each
level and coordinates the distribution of the workload among the agents. Finally,
it coordinates the alerts with the Interface agent and requid actions to take over
an attack when it has been detected. Avoiding the risk to compr ise the archi-
tecture to a fault, an anomaly agent can be promoted to be Manager agent. This
agent is selected by means of a voting method [50] between theAnomaly agents
as such is proposed.
• Interface agent: This agent allows the interaction of the user of the security sys-
tem with the architecture. The interface agent communicates th details of an
attack to the security personnel when an attack is detected.It has the ability to
work on mobile devices. This capacity allows a ubiquitous communication to
attend the alerts immediately.
• DB agent: It is in charge of executing the query in the database. When the query
has been classified as legal, then it executes on the databasend the results are
send to the user owner of the request.
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• Response agent: This agent delivery a response to the user once obtained a solu-
tion of the classification. If the query has been classified aslegal, the results of
the query are sent to the user interface. Otherwise, if the query has been classified
as illegal, it is sent to the user interface a warning message.
Figure 1 presents the abstract multiagent architecture showing different types of
agents in charge of the classification of SQL queries.
Fig. 1 Multiagent architecture for the classification of SQL queries
3.1 Communication among Agents
In distributed environments where the agents are applied assolution, it is essential
providing necessary mechanisms for the coordination and cooperation among the
agents so they can efficiently develop their tasks. The SiC architecture incorporates
agents to work on mobile device such as PDAs, Smart phones, computer notebooks
and also on workstations. The communication between the devices is carried out
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via wireless and LAN. The wireless mobile devices allow taking advantage of the
portability.
The communication among the type of agents is carried out using a standard rec-
ommend by FIPA (Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents) [8]. The standard is
named CAL (Communicative Act Library) which includes a set of performative to
build the message format. The platform to build SiC architecture has been JADE
(Java Agent Development Framework) [9], which is an implementation extended of
the FIPA standard and as such, it platform provides a set of libraries to development
the agents. The communication of the agents by remote deviceis through an exten-
sion HTTP of JADE. In the case of the mobile agents, it is used Jade-Leap [9][Jade-
Leap] that is other available extension of the framework. The Content specification
language used is FIPA-SL [20], which allows defining the message semantic ac-
cording to the type of contents of the message defined for SiC.Figure 2 shows an
example of the messages communicated between two agents of the architecture.
Fig. 2 Example of a format of message communicated among the agents.
Figure 2 presents a message format transmitted by an agent toother. Once cap-
tured the SQL query by a Sensor agent, this sends a message inform type to a Finger-
Print agent to carry out a detection based on pattern matching. The message includes
data of the captured SQL string such as transformed SQL string, data of the SQL
string analysis and user data owner of the query.
The types of messages used in the multi-agent architecture are: request, agree,
cancel, inform, query-if, subscribe, propose, reject-proposal, accept-proposal, fail-
ure and not-understood. The protocols used for the communication and negotiation
are the defined by FIPA: FIPA-request protocol, FIPA-query protocol and FIPA-
ContractNet protocol. The agents need to interact and negotiate continuously to
fulfill with the assigned task. Figure 3 present two examplesof the communication
between two agents through a protocol diagram.
Figure 3(a) shows the communication between the FingerPrint agent and the Pat-
tern agent to request stored SQL patterns when is applied themisuse detection. Fig-
ure 3(b) shows the message sent by the FingerPrint agent whenit s ds the results
generated by the capture of the SQL query, string analysis and user data.
The security is a primordial element in the agents communication. This resource
has been provided by a secure channel through the protocol HTTPS (Hy-pertext
Transfer Protocol Secure) [39]. HTTPS is an Internet Protocol that provides a SSL
layer of security. This protocol uses SSL and HTTP to protectthe communication
channel between the client and the server on a network. When HTTP is used to
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Fig. 3 Communications pattern during the interchange de message between the agents .
access the data on the Internet, HTTPS provides strong authentication. For the intern
communication between the agents, the solution applied wasby means of JADE-S
[9]. JADE-S is a plug-gin that supports user authenticationand agents, encryption
and signature of message, but JADE-S is limited for working with mobile agents.
4 Classifier Model of SQL Injection Attacks
The classifier CBR-BDI agent [37] incorporates a Case-BasedR asoning system
that allows the prevention and detection of a SQL injection attack. The prevention
and detection is support by a prediction model based on neural networks, config-
ured for short-term predictions of intrusions. This mechanism uses a memory of
cases which identifies past experiences with the corresponding indicators that char-
acterize each of the attacks. This paper presents a novel classific tion system that
combines the advantages of the CBR systems, such as learningnd adaptation, with
the predictive capabilities of a mixture of neural networks. These features make the
architecture appropriate for using it in dynamic environmets. Working with CBR
mechanism, the key concept is that of “case”. A case is definedas a previous expe-
rience and is composed of three elements: a description of the problem; a solution;
and the final state. To introduce a CBR motor into a BDI agent, we represent CBR
system cases using BDI and implement a CBR cycle. This CBR cycle consists of
four steps: retrieve, reuse, revise and retain.
The elements of the SQL query classification problem are described as follows:
• Problem Description: Describes the initial information available for generating a
classification. As can see in Table 1, the problem description consists of a case
identification, user session and SQL query elements.
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• Solution: Describes the action carried out in order to solvethe problem descrip-
tion. As can see in the Table 1, it contains the case identification nd the applied
solution.
• Final State: Describes the achieved state after that the solution has been applied.
It takes three possible values: attack, not attack o suspect. The multi-agent archi-
tecture incorporates the Manager agent, which allows an expert to evaluate the
classification.
Table 1 Structure of the problem definition and Solution for a case of SQL query classification
Problem description fields Solution fields
IdCase Integer Idcase Integer

















End Time Execution Time
QueryCategory Integer
The proposed mechanism is responsible to classify SQL database queries made
by users. When a user makes a new request, it is checked by a pattern matching.
These patterns are stored at a database that handles a significant number of signa-
ture not allowed on user level such as symbol combination, binary and hexadecimal
encoding and reserved statement of language (union, execute, drop, revoke, concat,
length, asc, chr among others). If the FingerPrint agent detects some known signa-
ture, it is automatically identified as an attack. In order toidentify the rest of the
SQL attacks, the Anomaly agent uses a CBR mechanism, which must have a mem-
ory of cases dating back at least 4 weeks, with the structure described in Table 1. The
problem description of a case is obtained by means of a stringanalysis technique
over the SQL query. This process can be understood easily throug the following
example: It receives a query with the following syntax: Select field1, field2, field3
from table1 where field1 = input1 and field2=input2.
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If the fields input1 and input2 are used to bypass the authentication mechanism
with the following input data: Input1=‘ or 9876= 9876 – and Input2= (blank). The
result of these input data would alter the SQL string as follows: Select field1, field2,
field3 from table1 where field1 =” or 9876 = 9876 - - ‘and field2= ”
The analysis of the SQL string would generate the result present d in the Table 2
with the following fields: Affectedtable(c1), Affected field(c2), Commandtype(c3),
Word GroupBy(c4), Word Having(c5), Word OrderBy(c6), NumberAnd(c7), Num-
ber Or(c8), Numberliterals(c9), LengthSQL String(c10), NumberLOL(c11), Cost-
Time CPU(c12), QueryCategory(13). The fields Commandtype and QueryCategory
have been encoding with the following nomenclature CommandType: 0=select,
1=insert, 2=update, 3=delete; QueryCategory: -1=suspicious, 0=illegal, 1=legal.
Table 2 SQL String transformed through the string analysis
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13
1 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 81 1 2.91 0
The first phase of the CBR cycle consists of recovering past experience from the
memory of cases, specifically those with a problem description s milar to the current
request. In order to do this, a cosine similarity-based algorithm is applied, allowing
the recovery of those cases which are at least 90% similar to the current request.
The cases recovered are used to train the mixture of neural networks implemented
in the reuse phase; the neural network with the sigmoidal functio is trained with
the recovered cases that were an attack or not, whereas the neural twork with hy-
perbolic function is trained with all the recovered cases (including the suspects). A
preliminary analysis of correlations is required to determine the number of neurons
of the input layer of the neuronal networks. Additionally, it is necessary to normal-
ize the data (i.e., all data must be values in the interval [0,1]). The data used to train
the mixture of networks must not be correlated. With the cases stored after delet-
ing correlated cases, the inputs for training the mixture ofnetworks are normalized.
It is considered to be two neural networks. The result obtained using a mixture of
the outputs of the networks provides a balanced response andavoids individual ten-
dencies (always taking into account the weights that determine which of the two
networks is more optimal).
Figure 4 shows the four steps of the CBR cycle including the mixture of the
neural networks through of an algorithm. This strategy of classification is carried out
inside of an Anomaly CBR-BDI agent. This Anomaly CBR-BDI agent is located on
a strategic level at the architecture.
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Fig. 4 Algorithm of the Cycle CBR for classifying SQL query
4.1 Learning Algorithm of the Neural Network
As is indicated earlier, an essential element is the mixtureof neural networks that
is used in the reuse stage of the CBR cycle by the Anomaly CBR-BDI agent to
predict attacks. This section describes in detail the operation of the mixture of neural
networks. The mixture uses two neural networks, and both of tem are multilayer
perceptrons, but use different types of activation functions. Each of these networks
obtains an individual solution for the problem. Then, the soluti ns provided are
combined to find the optimal classification. In figure 5 is showed the mixture of the
neural networks.
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Fig. 5 Capture of the mixture of the neural networks
The new case is presented to both neural network and then willeach neural net-
work give its opinion about the classification. The neural network based on a sig-
moidal function gives two results (illegal or legal) and theneural network through
a hyperbolic tangential function produce three results (illegal, legal or suspicious).
In the following paragraphs we describe the learning algorithm for the neural net-
works, explaining the differences for each type of network.The advantages of the
classification method provided by each of the individual networks are discussed.
Finally, the mixture is presented and formalized. The equations are presented in the
order they should be executed.
1. To present the input vector to the input layer.

















WhereW Pji is the weight that connects the neuron “i” from the input layer with
the neuron “j” from the hidden layer according to a “p” pattern (figure 5).θ Pj is
the threshold or bias associated to the neuron “j” from hidden layer according to
a “p” pattern.
3. To calculate the outputs of the neurons from the hidden layer.
Y pj = f j(net
p
j ), (3)
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Where f j is the deactivation function of the neurons “j” from the hidden layer.











whereW Pk j is the weight that connects the neuron “k” from the output layer with
the neuron “j” from the hidden layer according to a “p” pattern (figure 5).θ Pk , it
is the threshold or bias associated to the neuron “k” from output layer according
to a “p” pattern.
5. To calculate the output of the Neural Network.
Y pk = fk(net
p
k ), (5)
where fk is the activation function of the neuron “k” from the output layer.
6. To calculate the sensitivity of the neurons from the output layer based on error
showed at the output with the targeted output vector is defined as






δ pk = −
∂E p
∂ (net pk )
= (dpk − y
p
k ) =
∂ fk(net pk )
∂net pk
(7)
7. To calculate the sensibility of the neurons from the hidden layer is given by











8. To update the weights and the bias of the connections that connect the neurons
from the hidden layer with the output layer












η : Learning rate, it controls the size of the change of the weights in each iteration.
µ : Moment term, it allows to filter the oscillations in the surface of the error
caused by the learning rate and considerably accelerates the convergence of the
weights.
9. To upgrade the weights and the thresholds of the connectios between the neu-
rons of the hidden layer with the input layer
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wheredPk is the desired output of the neuron “k” from the output layer according
to a “p” pattern. Since this term reflects the adaptation capacity of the neural
network, it is necessary to keep it in mind to determine if theneural network
learns in a satisfactory way or not. As previously explainedthe mixture is com-
posed of two multilayer perceptrons, one of then uses sigmoidal function and the
other tangential function. In this sense, the algorithm hasto been particularized
considering as activation function, the sigmoidal and tangential function.
• The Sigmoidal activation function has its range at the interval [0,1]; It is used
to detect if the request is an attack or not. The value 0 represnts an illegal re-
quest and 1 a legal request. The Sigmoidal activation functio is the activation
function most used for classifications between two groups. This function has






Where it is particularized the results fora = 1
For the weights used to connect a hidden layer with an output layer; the up-
dating formula of the weights in series is given by a “p” pattern as follow.




















For the bias associated to the neurons from the output layer,giv n a “p” pat-
tern, the updating formula of the weights in series is















For the weights used to connect the input layer with the hidden layer; the
updating of the weights in series is give a “p” pattern is
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For the bias associated to the neurons from the hidden layer,giv n a “p pat-
tern; the updating in series as following:














j (t −1)) = (18)



















• The hyperbolic tangential function has its range in the interval [-1,1]. It is
used to detect if the request is an attack, not attack or suspicious. The hyper-
bolic tangential function allows more possible cases that te sigmoidal func-
tion. The value 0 represents illegal request, value 1 represnt legal request and
value -1 those suspicious requests. For the hyperbolic tangential function is
suitable for classifying in three groups. For the hyperbolic tangential activa-
tion function is given by




For the weights used to connect a hidden layer with an output layer, the up-
dating formula of the weights in series is given by a “p” pattern is




















For the bias associated to the neurons from the output layer,giv n a “p” pat-
tern; the updating formula of the weights in series is definedas











2)+ µ∆θ pk (t) (21)
For the weights used to connect the input layer with the hidden layer, the
updating of the weights in series is given by a “p” pattern is defined as




























For the bias associated to the neurons from the hidden layers, given a “p”
pattern, the updating in series is defined as
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j (t−1)) = (23)












2)wk j)+ µ(θ pj (t)−θ
p
j (t −1))
It is intended to detect attacks, so if one only network with asigmoidal acti-
vation function was used, then the result provided by the network would tend
to be attack or not attack, and no suspects would be detected.On the other
hand, if only one network with a hyperbolic tangent activation was used, then
a potential problem could exist in which the majority of the results would be
identified as suspect although they were clearly attack or not attack. The mix-
ture provides a more efficient configuration of the networks,since the global
result is determined by merging two filters. This way, if the two networks clas-
sify the user request as an attack, so too will the mixture; and if both agree
that it is not an attack, the mixture will as well be. If there is not concurrence,
the system uses the result of the network with the least errorin the training
process or classifies it as a suspect. In the reuse phase the two ne orks are
trained by a back-propagation algorithm for the same set of training patterns
(in particular, these neural networks are named MultilayerP rceptron), using
a Sigmoidal activation function (which will take values in [0,1], where 0 =
Illegal and 1 = legal) for a Multilayer Perceptron and a hyperbolic tangent
activation function for the other Multilayer Perceptron (which take values in
[-1,1], where -1 = Suspect, 0 = illegal and 1 = legal). The respon e of both net-
works is combined, obtaining the mixture of networks denoted by y2; where
the superscript indicates the number of mixtured networks,previously orderly








The number of neurons in the output layer for both MultilayerP ceptrons is
1, and is responsible for deciding whether or not there is an att ck. The error
of the training phase for each of the neural networks can be quantified with


















5 Results and disscusion
A case study has been proposed to test the effectiveness of a SiC prototype. The
prototype has been evaluated by mean of a previous developedmultiagent system,
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installed into a geriatric residence [18]. The implementedmultiagent system im-
proves the security of the patients, facilitates the carers’ activity and guarantees an
adequate level of efficiency. The system has been developed in a istributed environ-
ment containing devices such as PDA, notebook computers andaccess via wireless.
A back-end database stores and supplies information. The database manager is Or-
acle. The actors in the scenario such as nurses, doctors, patients, worker social and
other employees can be seen in Figure 6. The medical staff in charge of patients’s
care was integrated by 2 doctors, 10 nurses and 1 social worker. Th number of
patients under the monitoring and attention of the multi-agent system was of 30 in-
dividual. In the case of the nurses, each nurse was equipped with a PDA, thus a total
of 10 PDAs execute queries on the database during the workingday. With these data,
we prepared the attack scenario. The performance of the testrequired to incorporate
equips and mobile devices with connection via wireless and LAN. Equips include
2 workstations and regarding the mobile devices, 3 PDAs are nec ssary to the test.
The test has been carried out during 30 working days without interruption.
Fig. 6 Abstract scenario of the real environment (Geriatric Residence)
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During the execution of the multiagent system, several types of SQL queries were
carried on the database. The queries were related to the patints’ treatments, the
scheduling of the working day of the nurses, etc. Most of the qu ries were executed
from PDAs. The PDAs are used by doctors and nurses to accomplish their tasks.
To facilitate the evaluation of the prototype, we focused inthe nurse role. A main
volume of queries was generated each time that a plan was assigned to a nurse.
The plans changed by different reasons during their execution and these changes
increased the number of queries on the database. When a nurse start and finalizes
a task, sends a response through a SQL query. The nurses have direct access to the
database system by means of the application interface on thePDAs. The strategy
was based on the execution of crafted queries from 2 PDAs. These PDAs were
fixed with a similar user interface to the nurses’ PDAs, but these have capacity to
execute tainted queries. When a query is executed from the PDAof attack, this
query carries out a type of SQL injection that has to be captured, analyzed and
classified as legal, illegal or suspicious by our solution. The FingerPrint agents and
Anomaly agents were distributed in the 2 workstations. As the test was carried out
on the real medical database, a special mechanism has been built to g arantee the
integrity of the database. All the queries executed both by the nurses’ PDA and the
attack PDAs are examined and classified. The test was conducted wi h a total of
12 PDAs available, 10 PDAs assigned to the active nurses and 2PDAs to execute
attacks, a total of 10,200 queries were sent to the medical dat base. Each nurse’s
PDA executed around 30 daily queries and, during the 30 days of the test, 9,000 legal
queries were carried out. In the case of the two attack PDAs, each PDA executed
20 illegal daily queries. These PDAs sent 40 events of attackduring a working day.
Throughout the 30 days of the test, a total of 1,200 events of attack were targeted to
the medical database. The volume of queries during the test period allows building
a case memory to validate the strategy proposed.
To check the validity of the proposed model, we elaborated a serie of tests which
were executed on a memory of cases, specifically developed for these tests, and
which generated attack consults. The results obtained are promising, improving in
many cases those obtained with another existing techniques, which let us conclude
that SiC can be considered a serious alternative to detect and predict SQL injection
attacks. The classification system integrated within the Anomaly agent provides the
results shown in Table 3, which are promising: it is possibleto observe different
techniques for predicting attacks at the database layer andthe errors associated with
misclassifications. All the techniques presented in Table 3have been applied under
similar conditions to the same set of cases, taking the same problem into account
in order to obtain a new case common to all the methods. Note that the technique
proposed in this article provides the best results, with an error in only 0.5% of the
cases.
As shown in Table 3, the Bayesian method is the most accurate statistical method
since it is based on the likelihood of the events observed. But it has the disadvantage
of determining the initial parameters of the algorithm, although it is the fastest of
the statistical methods. Taking the errors obtained with the different methods into
account, after the neural networks and Bayesian methods we find the regression
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Table 3 Results obtained after testing different classification techniques
Forecasting Techniques Sucessful (%) Approximated Time (secs)
Anomaly CBR-BDI Agent (mixture NN) 99.5 2
Back-Propagation Neural Networks 99.2 2
Bayesian Forecasting Method 98.2 11
Exponential Regression 97.8 9
Polynomial Regression 97.7 8
Linear Regression 97.6 5
models. Because of the non linear behaviour of the hackers, linear regression offers
the worst results, followed by the polynomial and exponential regression. This can
be explained by looking at hacker behaviour: as the hackers br ak security mea-
sures, the time for their attacks to obtain information decreases exponentially. The
empirical results show that the best methods are those that involve the use of neu-
ral networks and, if we consider a mixture of two neural networks, the predictions
are notably improved. These methods are more accurate than satistical methods
for detecting attacks to databases because the behaviour ofthe hacker is not linear,
dynamic and chaotic.
The advantage of using a mixture of neural networks improvesperformance that
provides other classification techniques, but also improves p rformance that can
provide the neural networks on an individual basis. The mixture has the advantage
that the number of cases where the classifier agent does not decide is smaller and
in few cases would be needed the intervention by an expert human. We could check
the decision of the mixture of networks with the verdict of a human expert for those
cases which a single network did not decide and both the mixture of networks as the
human expert were in agreement on 99% of cases. In Figure 7 is shown the effec-
tiveness in the classification both for the networks with distinct activation function
work on an individual basis and the effectiveness of the mixture of networks.
Figure 8 shows the success of the predictions in function of the number of pat-
terns of training presented in Table 4. As can be observed, with a large number the
pattern of training, improve the percentage of successful prediction.
Table 4 Successful (%) depending on number of patterns of training
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Fig. 7 Effectiveness in the classification of the networks on an individual basis and the mixture of
networks
Fig. 8 Successful percentage vs. Number of patterns
When the number of patterns of training of the neural network increases, the
prediction error decreases (so successful increases). An important data to remark
is that the number de patterns of training are the result after pplying filters such
as the similarity based algorithm and the correlation functio . These filters reduce
the quantity of cases meaningfully in order to improve the performance during the
training stage.
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6 Conclusions
The problem of SQL injection attacks on databases supposes aserious threat against
information systems. This paper has presented novel solution, consisting on a new
hierarchical multiagent architecture for detecting SQL injection attacks which com-
bines the advantages of multiagent systems, such as autonomy and distributed prob-
lem solving, with the adaptation and learning capabilitiesof CBR systems. The
architecture proposes a new perspective in the detection and prediction of SQL in-
jection attacks, since the existing approaches are based oncentralized strategies. The
SiC architecture provides a distributed hierarchical structure which allows a more
efficient balance and distribution of the tasks involved in the problem of detecting
and classifying of attacks to databases by means of SQL injection. A special type
of CBR-BDI agent assures great capacities for learning and adapt tion. This agent
is a classifier agent that, supported by the philosophy of thecas -based reasoning
mechanism, proposes a new strategy, based on the use of past ex eriences, to clas-
sify SQL injection attacks. This strategy differs in its coneption from the existing
ones. Moreover, it incorporates the prediction capabilities hat characterize neural
networks.
Results show a hight success prediction capacity of our solution, about 99.5%
from the existing ones. A key factor for the success of SiC depends on the quality of
the case memory dating back at least 4 weeks. The mixture has the advantage that
the number of cases where the classifier agent does not decideis smaller and in few
cases would be needed the intervention by an expert human. Around 99% of cases
both the mixture of networks as the human expert were in agreement.
Finally, the SiC architecture combines techniques based onan maly detection
and misuse detection. This combination achieves a robust solution to block any type
of SQL injection attack. The multiagent architecture provides flexibility and scala-
bility to protect ubiquitous databases in new computation environments. The results
are promising and conclude that the SiC architecture improves results provided by
current technologies. A next step is to have a full solution where all the type of
agents in the architecture can carry out their tasks in orderto improve in global way
the effectiveness and the performance.
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